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RESHAPING CIVIL SOCIETY IN MOROCCO 
BOUNDARY SETTING, INTEGRATION AND 
CONSOLIDATION 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 323/DECEMBER 2009 
BOHDANA DIMITROVOVA
* 
Introduction 
While Morocco’s flourishing and relatively free civil society is a great achievement when 
compared with other countries in the Maghreb region, it would be mistaken to consider its 
political transformation ‘complete’. During the last 15 years, Morocco has developed a 
significant and diverse network of civil society organisations (CSOs), which has spurred inquiry 
into the significance and role of civil society in the country’s recent political and societal 
development (Huber, 2004, 2005; Sater, 2007). Western researchers (Ottaway and Riley, 2006) 
have been quick to evaluate the status of Moroccan civil society, its weaknesses and strengths, 
while advocating a reinforcement of the EU’s democratisation policies and supporting the 
advancement of independent civil society as a precondition for genuine democracy and 
development. What is frequently overlooked in this research is the inconsistent and changing 
nature of civil society, which is sometimes supportive of and at other times hostile or indifferent 
to the EU’s democratic and often neoliberal-inspired agendas. 
The recent debate on the role and importance of civil society activity in the context of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) highlights the need for a strong and vibrant civil 
society. From the EU’s point of view, the degree of independence, efficiency and productivity 
of civil society are signs of progress, modernisation and democratisation. Yet, this can also 
imply that civil society is defined according to a static framing of pre-defined values rather than 
in terms of contextual understandings that reflect the complexity, contentedness or instability of 
local civil societies. This paper attempts to go beyond restrictive definitions of civil society that 
downplay the reality that civil society is not always supportive of the EU’s policies and is not 
always in opposition to the state. This paper seeks to demonstrate how the study of civil society 
can help us to better understand both the logic and incongruity of Morocco’s political and social 
progress.
1  
Morocco’s political opening in the 1990s brought to local civil society a new dimension of 
internationalisation, diversification and professionalism. In theory, the legal frameworks in 
                                                            
* Dr Bohdana Dimitrovova is a Research Fellow at the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research, Radboud 
University Nijmegen, the Netherlands and an Associate Research Fellow at the Center for European 
Policy Studies, Brussels. This research is based on the EUDIMENSIONS research project (financed by 
the 6
th Framework Programme, Contract CIT5-2005-028804) as well as the research project, the External 
Image of the EU: Views from Morocco and Algeria (financed by the Volkswagen Stiftung, the European 
Foreign and Security Policy Studies (EFSPS) programme). This paper will be published in a forthcoming 
special issue of the Journal of European Integration. 
1 The analysis in this Working Document draws from 40 in-depth, face-to-face interviews conducted with 
civil society actors, government officials, MEPs and European diplomats in Morocco from April to June 
in 2009, in the context of two research projects, EUDIMENSIONS and the EFSPS. All interviewees were 
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Morocco are conducive to the development of civil society, which has experienced a 
considerable boom since the late 1980s.
2 In 1979, Morocco ratified the International Pact on 
Civil and Political Rights, and freedom of association has since become a constitutional right 
(Kausch, 2008a). In 2002, new legislation was adopted to facilitate the use of foreign funding 
by Moroccan CSOs (for details see Khakee, 2008). Formal rejection of a legally registered 
association is rather unusual, unless a CSO publicly challenges the three ‘taboos’: national 
territorial integrity (particularly with regard to the question of Western Sahara), the primacy of 
Islam and the legitimacy of the king. Furthermore, international pressure coupled with financial 
support for CSOs has promoted an agenda focused on political and civic rights (e.g. human 
rights, women’s rights, freedom of the press and association). Consequently, in a process that 
could be termed ‘boundary setting’, the state has had to re-regulate state–civil society relations 
by defining the political spheres assigned to state and civil society actors.  
This paper explores three domains of civil society endeavour – women’s rights, human rights 
and socio-economic rights – that have triggered different responses by the Moroccan state and 
the international community. More specifically, it investigates cooperation mechanisms and 
opportunity structures for the promotion of civil society activism that have emerged as a result 
of the EU’s policies and within the context of the ENP. Three empirical examples are used to 
illustrate the complex dynamics of state–civil society relations in Morocco and the 
contradictions inherent to EU policies that seek to promote civil society in that country.  
1.  Conceptualising civil society 
Use of the concept of civil society has often been associated with the analysis of opposition to 
non-democratic states in the Eastern European neighbourhood (Gellner, 1994; Hirsch, 2002). As 
in the case with the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, this understanding 
of civil society and its oppositional role under authoritarian regimes has been prominent with 
regard to the Mediterranean region. According to this dichotomised view of state and civil 
society relations, the most persistent voices for change come from civil society. It is assumed 
that civil society fosters political liberalisation and leads to increased civic participation in the 
public sphere. At the same time, maintaining an exclusive link between civil society and the 
democratisation process neglects those CSOs that operate outside this dichotomy. Furthermore, 
and as discussed bellow, this interpretation is limited by the omnipresence and vigilance of the 
state, which has proven skilful at co-opting social movements. A process of political reform has 
certainly taken place in Morocco, but it would be misleading to attribute the origins of this 
reform to civil society. Indeed, the democratisation potential of Moroccan civil society is 
limited. By the same token, it is important to emphasise that Moroccan CSOs have contributed 
to political transformation but within the clearly defined boundaries of a ‘public sphere’. This 
incorporates another perspective on civil society, as an arena of argument and deliberation, 
which equates civil society with the public sphere.  
Nevertheless, empirical evidence suggests that the possibility of dialogue within this normative 
public sphere where “a fair balance of interests can come about only when all concerned have 
equal right to participation” (Habermas, 1999, p. 72) is rather limited. Large segments of 
Moroccan society are excluded from the public sphere. Groups that do not accept the status quo 
imposed by the political elite are shunned by the makhzenian structures.
3 For instance, Islamists 
or extreme left organisations, as well as some Berber and Sahrawi groups are considered anti-
                                                            
2 Although it is impossible to verify the exact number of CSOs, estimates suggests that between 30,000 
and 80,000 associations are registered in Morocco.  
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constitutional for their refusal to recognise the spiritual authority and political legitimacy of the 
king, or in the specific case of the Sahrawi, for challenging the territorial integrity of the 
Moroccan monarchy. These politics of exclusion and inequality are diametrically opposed to 
Habermasian (1999) notions of the public sphere, in which dialogue between the state and civil 
society is based on mutually accepted ethical principles. The oppressive character of the 
Moroccan public sphere has important consequences for the actual functioning of civil society. 
It is agued here that civil society does not always adhere to the principles of ‘civility’ and 
‘tolerance’, and that it can be subject to political patronage and competition. In addition, there is 
the question of relations between Moroccan CSOs and major international partners, including 
the EU. Some Moroccan CSOs have described their relationship with European partners as 
asymmetric and patronising:  
For the EU projects, we are obliged to work with European partners who are also the 
recipients of grants. Although we have our local experts and expertise on the ground, 
we also have to use very expensive European experts who have very rarely added value 
to our work. We have signalled this problem to the EC [European Commission] 
Delegation in Rabat but all instructions come from Brussels.
4 
Another difficulty with Habermas’s somewhat idealistic notion of the public sphere is the elitist 
nature of Moroccan civil society and its weak social impact. Scholars such Denoueux and 
Gateau (1995) have pointed out that many Moroccan CSOs are linked more to the state than to 
the real concerns of society, which raises the question of whom civil society actually represents. 
The elite character of mainly urban CSOs and their distance from the reality on the ground has 
generated widespread scepticism of ‘active’ or responsible citizenship through community 
involvement as promulgated by Anglo-Saxon schools of thought. Furthermore, the close 
involvement of many CSOs in the political and administrative machinery of the government and 
resulting relationship of ‘patronage’ seriously limit citizen participation, as pointed out by one 
Moroccan activist in Rabat: 
CSOs of big cities have been generated by the French-speaking, middle-class 
intellectual elite. They have almost no contact with ordinary Moroccans and their daily 
problems. This distance creates mistrust among Moroccan people about the goals of 
civil society and its potential is significantly reduced to high politics.
5 
While ‘communitarian’ approaches (Etzioni, 1993; Putnam, 1993) can hardly be applied in the 
case of urban-based CSOs, the grassroots networks of local associations continue to exist in 
spite of restrictions and their marginalisation from decision-making processes. This 
communitarian perspective stresses the essential contribution of civil society in promoting 
community well-being and shaping policies to combat socio-economic deprivation. Some 
Moroccan scholars who have studied Western concepts of citizenship and autonomous civil 
society (among them Saaf, 1992) go so far as to argue that Moroccan civil society is not 
compatible with Western models of civil society. It is not merely an issue of socio-economic or 
structural difference, but also one of the mentality of a majority of Moroccans and their lack of 
understanding of notions of active citizenship. The existing structures of clientelism and neo-
patrimonialism, which have often been dominated by charismatic figures, impede the 
development of an active and strong civil society (Layachi, 1998). If we look beyond officially 
registered CSOs, we find extensive networks of grassroots organisations that have emerged 
spontaneously in rural areas to assist local communities overcome everyday challenges (Roque, 
2004). 
                                                            
4 Derived from the author’s interview with a local civil society activist, 6 June 2009, Rabat. 
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1.1  A question of women’s rights: Internationalisation and integration 
The feminist movement in Morocco illustrates how elite and communitarian approaches can 
exacerbate social conflicts instead of reinforcing the civic virtues of trust and cooperation. It 
also illustrates the ambiguous role of civil society vis-à-vis the state, a highly religious 
Moroccan society and the international community. There are more than 30 women’s rights 
organisations in Morocco. Some of them deal with the political and institutional emancipation 
of women, others with socio-economic issues such as education and poverty. The Democratic 
Association of Moroccan Women (Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc, ADFM), 
one of the leading and oldest feminist organisations (founded in 1985), clearly has an elite 
character with little presence on the ground in local communities. ADFM’s main target groups 
are urban intellectuals; its primary objective is to contribute to broader discussion about 
women’s rights and to promote new legislation based on equal rights between men and women. 
In contrast, Islamic movements with a different interpretation of women’s rights have 
traditionally been strong in rural areas.  
The ADFM, together with other women’s rights organisations, has played an important role in 
advocating and negotiating the reform of Moroccan family law (the Moudawana), which has led 
to clashes and further animosity with Islamist movements. In protest against these proposed 
reforms, in 2000 the Islamists organised a massive demonstration in Casablanca with more than 
300,000 participants – delaying the adoption of the new family code until February 2004. 
Whereas for the Islamists, the ultimate sources of legal legitimacy are religious texts (sharia), 
secular women’s organisations refer to international law and Morocco’s obligations as a 
signatory to UN conventions on women’s rights. As commented by one female Islamist 
parliamentarian about the Moudawana, 
[o]ur protest in Casablanca was not religious but political. It was a protest against the 
interventions of the West in our cultural affairs, against the dictate of how to change 
Moudawana. For us it was once again cultural aggression and humiliation. We were 
never against the reform of the family code. In fact, sharia is a source for liberation of 
women, which can go even further than the current family code if the West lets our 
internal dynamics develop.
6 
Yet some feminist activists have acknowledged the necessity of religion being a primary source 
for reforming the Moudawana in order to avoid the alienation of Muslim society. A former 
director of the umbrella association Espace Associatif, who is a women’s rights activist, 
explained it this way:  
What I learned during my combat for women’s rights is that we can reinforce the 
principles of tolerance and diversity via Islam. In fact, there is no other way. The 
majority of our society is deeply religious…we need to work through the religious texts 
and not alienate women [who] are religious and who would see it as an attack on 
Islam.
7  
At the same time, the process of reforming legislation on family matters needs to be understood 
within the framework of the state’s interests and its involvement. The palace’s intervention and 
the king’s religious authority were instrumental in the adoption of a revised Moudawana that 
had been resisted by religious representatives of civil society. The state apparatus has gradually 
                                                            
6 Derived from the author’s interview with the deputy of the Justice and Development Party, 3 June 2009, 
Rabat. 
7 Derived from the author’s interview with a former director of the Espace Associatif, 29 May 2009, 
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adopted, and at times prompted, the discourses of women’s rights groups while shaping the final 
content of the Moudawana. Hence, the success of the reform has been attributed to the palace 
and a progressive monarch (Mohammed VI). The new code undoubtedly represents a significant 
step in women’s rights in the Arab world. Its implementation, however, has been slow owing to 
a variety of factors such as a lack of information and awareness among women about the new 
law and an ineffective judicial system. The Moudawana debates also highlighted questions 
about the application of the universality of women’s rights and regional demands for respecting 
the particularities in Muslim society.  
1.2  A question of human rights 
The very remarkable shift in the state’s strategy, from oppression to support and ultimately to 
the encouragement of certain kinds of CSOs (particularly human rights and women’s rights 
organisations), has brought a new dimension to state–civil society relations. Both domestic and 
external pressures have prompted the state to change its strategies in dealing with civil society. 
Some observe that the state’s encouragement of civil society is not necessarily a sign of political 
will and inclusiveness, but is rather a new strategy of the palace to control and contain newly 
emerging and expanding urban elites.
8 The regime’s tolerant approach towards CSOs 
nonetheless confirms the continuing process of democratisation in the eyes of the EU, and 
according to some, it has served the king’s strategy of marginalising political parties (Willis, 
2004).  
Most of the king’s initiatives have been aimed at improving Morocco’s record on human rights. 
These have resulted in Morocco achieving an image of the most advanced EU neighbour in the 
Mediterranean and as a ‘good student’ of Europe. The most important of the king’s initiatives 
has been the formation of the Royal Advisory Council for Human Rights (Conseil Consultatif 
des Droits de l’Homme, CCDH), later the ministry of human rights (1993) and more recently 
the establishment of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (2003). The latest initiative, a 
truth commission (Instance Équité et Réconciliation, IER), was set up by the monarch and 
financially supported by the European Commission to examine human rights violations and 
forced disappearances during the ‘années de plomb’ [years of lead].
9 Despite its shortcomings 
and limited scope for investigation, the IER has been a revolutionary undertaking in the Arab 
world. It has had significant results in terms of awarding financial compensation, collecting 
personal testimonies and above all, raising the question of government responsibility for forced 
disappearances and human rights abuses.  
Public funding for CSOs is channelled through the ministry of solidarity, but only a few large 
NGOs close to the government (government-organised NGOs, ‘GONGOs’) receive public 
funds. The most recent example is the Foundation Mohammed V pour la Solidarité, which was 
set up by the palace and which closely follows the agenda set by the government. Similarly, 
some international donors often direct their funding to associations established by the state or 
those associations with close contacts. There is a consensus among the Moroccan CSOs 
interviewed for this study that EU assistance has a state-centred, top-down character that 
consequently excludes many local CSOs. Most of the European Commission’s funding (i.e. the 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument or MEDA funds) is channelled through 
government bodies, which end up in the same pro-government circles of civil society. The 
inflexibility of the EU, coupled with its lack of adaptability to local contexts and highly 
                                                            
8 It is estimated that more than 50% of Moroccans live in towns. 
9 During the 1960s and 1970s, when the king faced considerable challenges, including coup d’états, 
hundreds of palace opponents disappeared and thousands were imprisoned and tortured.  8 | BOHDANA DIMITROVOVA 
 
institutionalised approach are recognised as weaknesses that limit the effective implementation 
of its programmes and more broadly affect the EU’s image in Morocco.  
There are two major organisations that shape the discursive realm of political and civic rights 
and that illustrate the state’s different strategies of control and containment of civil society 
discourses. Both civil society protagonists demonstrate the polemic of autonomy or 
independence of civil society vis-à-vis the state. The first, the Moroccan Organisation for 
Human Rights (OMDH), stays outside the party-based struggles, accepting the political status 
quo while addressing the deficiencies of human rights practices. Yet this proclaimed 
independence from the political structures has been challenged by the OMDH’s decision to join 
the state- and European Commission-sponsored CCDH. The OMDH’s cooperation with the 
regime has launched a new phase of legitimisation and modernisation of the makhzen power. 
The second organisation, the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH), was 
established in 1979 by the socialist political party (the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, 
USPF). The AMDH directly challenges the democratic deficits of the current political system 
and the centralisation of the monarch’s power but within a defined framework of mutual 
acceptance. Its affiliation with the left, its radical battle for human rights and its demands for 
changes to the constitution have provoked several confrontations with the state authorities, 
surveillance and repression of their activities. One member of the AMDH explains the 
organisation’s objectives: 
We want to work according to UN principles and international law. Morocco has 
accepted these international principles and we want to see that they are being 
implemented. The EU has given Morocco [an] advanced status not because of excellent 
performance on human rights but because of mutual economic and security interests. 
Europe itself is violating human rights in the fight against illegal migrants but it 
continues to represent itself as a carrier of values.
10 
There is agreement among the CSOs that the EU lacks credibility because it appears to be more 
interested in pursuing its own economic gain (see the section on socio-economic rights below) 
and securing its interests than seriously promoting human rights. Some human rights activists 
pointed at the serious repression of human rights after the terrorist attacks in Casablanca in May 
2003. Since the Casablanca events, the Moroccan authorities have tightened security measures, 
often at the expense of human rights, and called for restrictions on the activities of the 
Moroccan Islamist party (the Justice and Development Party). This security approach has been 
encouraged, if not initiated, by the EU (particularly some of its member states)
11 and the US. 
Still, the EU has kept a low profile on its anti-terrorist policies in Morocco. By contrast, the US-
led ‘war on terrorism’ has adversely affected US cooperation with some segments of civil 
society, although less so with the government. Several associations, among them the AMDH 
and the National Trade Union of the Moroccan Press (Syndicat national de la presse marocaine, 
SNPM), have initiated a boycott of US funding, criticising its hegemonic agenda, lack of respect 
of human rights and the US policy on the Palestinian territories and wider Arab regions. As 
explained by the president of the SNPM, they have no problems with the EU, which promotes 
cooperation based on partnership and dialogue, whereas the US seeks to infiltrate domestic 
affairs through its democracy-promotion programmes.
12 The same actors stress that their refusal 
                                                            
10 Derived from the author’s interview with a member of the AMDH, 16 June 2009, Rabat. 
11 For instance, the UK increasingly focuses on anti-radicalisation activities linked to countering 
terrorism. Derived from the author’s interview with British diplomats, 24 June 2009, Rabat.  
12 Derived from the author’s interview with the president of the SNPM, 9 June 2009, Rabat. RESHAPING CIVIL SOCIETY IN MOROCCO | 9 
 
of US funding
13 is not solely based on ideological grounds; rather, they simply state that 
terrorism and radicalisation are phenomena imported from outside, which do not reflect 
Moroccan realities. Yet many other CSOs, particularly in the field of development and 
economic assistance, have no objections to American funding, arguing that there is no political 
interference in their activities.  
The control that political parties exercise over civil society brings another important ingredient 
to the study of the dynamics of civil society. It is not uncommon for civil society activists to be 
members of political parties or appointed members of local councils, giving rise to the risk of 
political manipulation. Thus, CSOs often become known through the activities of their leaders, 
who use their affiliation with civil society for personal enrichment or political activities. This 
‘personnalism’ reinforces mistrust and suspicion on the part of Moroccans vis-à-vis civil society 
actors. As regards the CSO leadership, civil society activists have emphasised the need to open 
up CSOs in terms of institutionalisation and professionalisation in order to transcend 
charismatic leadership structures. This political affiliation of CSOs does not necessarily 
undermine their independence, however. In the case of human rights, the incorporation of CSOs 
in state-initiated structures has enabled civil society to influence the agenda from within. In 
other areas such as women’s rights, association with political parties can be counterproductive 
because the objectives can go against the interests of political parties and vice versa. While 
cooperation with state authorities is necessary and desirable, it is important for civil society to 
be aware of the dangers of co-option and corruption.  
The creation of the above-mentioned institutions illustrates the state’s strategy of appropriation 
and institutionalisation of human rights discourses instead of their straightforward suppression – 
an approach that is also characteristic of its Maghreb neighbours (Algeria and Tunisia). The 
allocation of public space to civil society actors by the Moroccan state has additionally been a 
consequence of the gradual modernisation of the state and the building of a certain kind of 
pluralism and modern political institutions similar to the Western model. In this context, the EU 
has been instrumental in supporting political transformation and integrating Morocco into a 
European system of governance, albeit in very selective and sometimes contradictory ways. 
Drawing on a Foucauldian genealogy of the modern state (Foucault, 2004), the shift in the 
power logic from the visible and direct defence of territory to more subtle and de-territorialised 
forms of controlling population is reflected in contemporary discourses and practices regarding 
the development of Moroccan civil society. This process of “upgrading and diversifying 
mechanisms of control” needs to be understood in the context of Morocco’s gradual integration 
of European elements of governance and EU norms, which goes beyond the official system of 
state power. Although the principles of national territorial integrity and control over territory 
continue to be central to the identity of the Moroccan state, the makhzen is adopting new forms 
of political power. These include the containment of civil society, codification of their activities 
and appropriation of their discourses.  
1.3  A question of socio-economic rights 
The emphasis on civil and political rights does not necessarily reflect the main concerns of the 
majority of Moroccan families suffering from poor health and education systems, illiteracy and 
high rates of unemployment.
14 The long neglected and deteriorating socio-economic issues have 
                                                            
13 The anti-terrorist and anti-radicalisation strategies and programmes of the British government have 
been subjected to the same criticism.  
14 The illiteracy rate reaches 60.5% in rural areas. Unemployment stands at 18.4% in the towns and 32.7% 
among the youth (source: European Commission, European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument, 10 | BOHDANA DIMITROVOVA 
 
provoked questions about the state’s obligation to provide basic socio-economic rights to its 
citizens. The reluctance or relative inability of the Moroccan state to assume its societal 
responsibilities and its socially integrating role puts pressure on civil society to become social 
welfare providers. Furthermore, a lack of economic dynamism means that the private sector is 
unable to meet many of the fundamental and basic needs of the population. 
The importance of socio-economic CSOs has increased rapidly in recent years, often in response 
to the state’s inability to deal with the socio-economic problems of Moroccan citizens. 
Similarly, the education, employment and health sectors have not been a priority for the EU 
since economic liberalisation, and lately security, tend to dominate the EU–Morocco agenda.
15 
As pointed out by one civil society activist, “the state finds it convenient to delegate rather 
unpopular tasks to the civil society sector, arguing that it goes beyond its capacity. It has been a 
useful tool to attract foreign financial aid.”
16  
There are two kinds of the ‘development’ associations. The first group are Islamic charity 
organisations, which have been important providers of many basic services for a long time, 
particularly to marginalised communities outside the major urban centres and to groups affected 
by poverty and social exclusion. For instance, Roque (2004) points to the remarkable voluntary 
health associations that seek to compensate for the absence of the state in the health care. Most 
of them are excluded from Western financial assistance and some refuse foreign aid. The vast 
majority of them operate without an overall support structure and are highly reliant on citizen 
participation and activism. Their efficiency, volunteer base and strong grassroots links have 
been considered a new threat to the state, but they are a product of the state’s ignorance and 
deficiency in addressing the socio-economic problems facing Moroccan society.  
To counter the societal force of Islamic associations, the state has launched a strategy of 
establishing a second group of development CSOs and introducing new initiatives (Huber, 
2004). Some CSOs (among them the Association Marocaine de Solidarité et de Développement 
or AMSED, and the Association Marocaine d’Appui à la Promotion de la Petite Entreprise or 
AMAPPE) have assumed responsibility for socio-economic matters such as health care, support 
of basic urban services, poverty reduction and education. Many of the social welfare providers 
are set up by local councils or governmental bodies. This empowerment of civil society in the 
area of development has been received positively by the international donor community, which 
in turn funds the majority of such CSOs. The external funding is welcomed, encouraged and 
supervised by the state authorities. For instance, the National Initiative for Human Development 
established by the king has immediately attracted international funding, including European 
Commission allocations, and it continues to be closely monitored by the state authorities.  
Environmentalist groups have also been taking on the state’s role and responsibilities for 
protection of the environment. Like many other socio-economic CSOs, these groups are funded 
on a project basis by international donors. Instead of putting pressure on the state or on the EU 
and its member states, environmental issues are sporadically addressed by local and 
international CSOs. The opening up of the Moroccan economy, with few obligations or 
regulations for foreign investors, can bring short-term benefits, but – as some local activists and 
researchers point out – it entails consequences for the environment, and in the longer term, for 
tourism.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
Morocco Strategy Paper, 2007-2013, Brussels, 2007 (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/ 
country/enpi_csp_morocco_en.pdf). 
15 See European Commission, EU–Morocco Action Plan, Brussels, 2004a (retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/morocco_enp_ap_final_en.pdf). 
16 Derived from the author’s interview with a researcher at the Mohammed V University, 10 April 2009. RESHAPING CIVIL SOCIETY IN MOROCCO | 11 
 
Meanwhile, new initiatives and new discourses are emerging to quieten those voices calling for 
social justice. While the state has been able to incorporate the discourses and practices of civil 
and political rights into the public sphere, student unions and associations of the unemployed 
remain beyond the state’s direct sphere of influence. Their radical strategy of street politics and 
demands for better living conditions are more difficult for the state to contain. The student 
unions and associations of the unemployed have been subjected to repression and their street-
based activities
17 have incited several clashes with the state authorities. One activist and a 
member of the student association explained their stance: 
We want the state to take responsibility for creating jobs and ensuring a basic social 
security system. How can we talk about human rights if the basic services are absent 
from the state policy? It is not only the Moroccan state that is to blame but also 
international organisations and the EU for its liberalisation policies.
18  
These concerns have also been voiced by some Moroccan activists who, in their assessment of 
the ENP, have stated that its weakness lies precisely in the emphasis placed on its political and 
economic content, while its social content is seriously deficient. Others have criticised the 
eurocentrism of the free trade agreement (FTA) and discontent over the US–Morocco FTA 
ratified in 2005. Crombois (2005) points out that the FTA with the US has mobilised Moroccan 
civil society including the media. Whereas political parties often remain silent on foreign policy, 
civil society has organised sit-in protests in front of the parliament and petitions against unequal 
and harmful FTAs. The FTA envisaged by the EU would privilege industrial sectors in which 
the EU is competitive while downplaying the role of agricultural trade, traditionally of great 
importance to Morocco. Conspicuously, the EU’s emerging geopolitical strategy in Morocco is 
heavily influenced by economic agendas and the management of the negative ‘externalities’ of 
market expansion.  
There is very little critical reflection among CSOs (including academics, journalists or activists) 
about the ramifications of a common market, which would include all the goods covered by the 
sectors where the south is competitive, i.e. essentially the agricultural sector. Such a market 
presupposes a very significant supporting policy, which the EU is not ready to offer. One of the 
reasons for this lack of evaluation is the indoctrination of liberalisation and modernisation 
discourses among Moroccan elites, who have profited from deepening relations with Europe. 
Another factor is that political and civil rights have occupied a central place in civil society 
agendas for a long time at the expense of economic and social issues. 
Only a few organisations – among them the ‘leftist’ (i.e. the AMDH) and Islamists movements 
– openly challenge this consensus about the inability of the state to deal with socio-economic 
development and environmental issues. The best known of these is also one of the most active 
and most repressed Islamist non-violent movements – the Justice and Benevolence association 
(Al Adl wal Ihssane, AWI). AWI, which falls into the category of opposition, is challenging not 
only the monarchy but also the Western ideology of the promotion of ‘free’ markets. The group 
has been declared illegal, their activities are prohibited and its members are occasionally 
arrested. Despite prohibition and surveillance by the Moroccan authorities, this membership-
based group continues to operate and even gain in popularity (Zeghal, 2008). Nadja Yassine, an 
AWI militant and the daughter of its charismatic leader Sheik Yassine, explains the dangers of 
what she calls “savage capitalism”:  
                                                            
17 Masses of unemployed students demonstrate almost daily in front of the parliament in Rabat.  
18 Derived from the author’s conversations with participants of daily protests in front of the national 
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Morocco has no more choice. So it is [no longer] a question if we want to liberalise our 
economy but rather under what conditions we want to open our economy. It is not true 
that Islam is against liberalisation. We are against the current form of liberalism, which 
cannot address the dangers to the environment and which doesn’t deal with poverty. It 
is not Islam as a religion that is a threat to the West but our protest against Western 
exploitation and unregulated investment.
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In this context, the EU is reluctant to engage with Islamist movements because of their 
mobilising power within Moroccan society and because of their open criticism and rejection of 
current EU (and EU member state) policies – seen as a form of economic and cultural 
hegemony. These movements are among the very few actors in Morocco that openly criticise 
the US FTA and the EU for its patronising approach to cooperation while urging dialogue with 
Muslim societies.  
Shifting responsibility for providing basic services and for economic development to the civil 
society domain is a very risky business. It creates a paradoxical situation in which civil society 
becomes an instrument for legitimising the government’s policy of economic liberalisation. In 
circumstances where the state and international institutions, among them the EU, are ultimately 
the driving force behind liberalisation processes, it is hard to imagine that civil society can play 
a significant role in addressing the causes of socio-economic deprivation within Moroccan 
society. It also raises questions about the accountability of development initiatives in which the 
state (or international institutions) acts as the initiator and civil society as the implementing 
agent. Another difficulty is that since the palace owns a large share of the Moroccan economy, it 
is therefore hypocritical, at the very least, to expect that civil society can resolve economic 
issues.  
2.  Re-framing civil society through the ENP  
Cooperation between Morocco and the EU is conditioned on a complex geopolitical situation. 
This Maghreb state (along with Algeria and Tunisia) finds itself both ‘included’ and ‘excluded’ 
from greater cooperation with the EU. France, Spain and Italy have been the principal 
protagonists in developing bilateral relations for a number of reasons. The urgency of 
developing a cooperation agenda with Morocco results partly from the very close economic 
dependency of the Maghreb on the EU, geographic proximity and strong post-colonial ties with 
France and Spain.  
Increased regional trade and investment, a general goal of the ENP, is seen as a mechanism for 
combating poverty and thus reducing pressure on the EU to accommodate immigrants from the 
region. Indeed, pressures originating from undocumented migration and illicit trade have 
highlighted the sensitivity of the EU’s southern borders and become a priority issue in EU–
Moroccan relations. Morocco, under increasing strain as a transit country for migrants from 
deeper Africa, seeks enhanced financial and technical assistance from the EU for upgrading 
border controls and its security apparatus in general.
20 As mentioned above, the focus on 
security in the ENP and the buffering logic of the EU has not only had negative impacts on 
human rights but has also imposed new priorities on civil society. At the same time, the EU is 
demanding ‘shared responsibility’ for combating illegal cross-border activities and ‘common 
                                                            
19 Derived from the author’s interview with Nadja Yassine (on 5 June 2009 in Rabat), who agreed to be 
quoted as part of this research.  
20 In 2000–04, the European Commission allocated €40 million to Morocco for migration management 
and border control (source: European Commission, Euro-Med Partnership,  National Indicative 
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security threats’. Hence, new EU funding is available for migration projects. This approach, 
however, is viewed as problematic by some and not conducive to the promotion of human 
rights. As explained by a representative of GADEM
21 (a Moroccan, anti-racist CSO protecting 
the rights of migrants and foreigners), 
[w]e were approached by several international organisations, mainly Italians, to 
cooperate on anti-migration projects, basically to stop and prevent people from moving 
to Europe. This goes against the most fundamental right, which is freedom to move. In 
our view, it is not the responsibility of civil society to serve the interests of the EU and 
its member states. Our job is to help and protect those who suffer from the EU’s anti-
migration and security policies. 
The EU has found common ground with the state but less so with civil society. As viewed by 
Moroccan civil society, the ENP is essentially a form of development aid that is compensating 
for the disappearance of trading preferences while promoting economic transition. Instead of 
fostering principles of tolerance and civility, CSOs are being coerced to become agents and 
guardians of Western interests of economic hegemony. 
The guiding principle behind the ENP is recognition that if the EU wants to become a credible 
actor in the southern Mediterranean, then the promotion of democracy and stable societies in the 
region will require a more active role on the part of the EU. It will necessitate a dialogue in 
which not only economic development (e.g. the creation of a free trade area) but also broader 
political and cultural aspects are prioritised. 
As a result, the problem of reconciling inclusionary partnership policies with exclusionary 
security policies is perhaps particularly pronounced in EU–Moroccan relations. Notably, there 
appears to be little interaction between the principal actors involved in the ENP and the CSOs.  
Among the challenges facing Moroccan CSOs are the strong resistance to shifts from 
grassroots-based to professional organisations and the need to maintain independence through 
avoiding (over)dependency on EU funding. Although foreign funding is vital for the survival of 
a large number of CSOs, there is a general awareness of the associated risks and the possible 
negative effects of dependency on external funding. Some have described the risks in terms of 
becoming a “project business”, whereby NGOs have to adapt to the requirements of a funder’s 
calls for proposals instead of focusing on their own domestic agenda. Others have spoken about 
the technical difficulties involved in managing projects when reporting and proposal writing 
becomes a priority above fieldwork. Nevertheless, there was no consensus about the 
professionalisation and internationalisation of civil society. Nefissa (2001) points out that the 
professionalisation of NGOs can substitute their preoccupations with charity, solidarity and 
development. The EU’s top-down, ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is not conducive to the 
advancement of a vibrant and diverse civil society. A lack of coordination among international 
donors as well as among governmental agencies leads to the duplication of activities or the 
adoption of different strategies that are not always compatible. Most public and international 
funding is received on a project basis, which has several consequences. The limited funding of 
human resources and office costs leads to a situation wherein some NGO activists must handle 
several jobs while others have political functions. A Western model of full-time professional 
occupations is not yet established, which according to some NGO representatives constitutes a 
significant hindrance to the emergence of a strong and professional civil society.  
                                                            
21 GADEM refers to the Groupe antiraciste accompagnement et de défense des étrangers et migrants. 
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3. Concluding  remarks 
Morocco’s strategy of intensifying and deepening its relations with the EU has resulted in the 
state’s adoption of civil society discourse and in the state allowing and sometimes even 
encouraging the activities of certain CSOs. Nonetheless, the assumption that civil society is 
integral to the state and therefore lacking the potential for change or confrontation is analytically 
reductive. While some CSOs are more directly governed by the makhzen, others have to fight 
for official recognition.  
When new voices emerge, the state seeks to establish new institutions and new advisory 
councils to the king, and it adopts new regulations and legislation. The creation of institutions 
such as the CCDH, the IER or the National Initiative for Human Development by the palace is, 
for instance, one route towards taking control of new civil society discourses. This rather 
reactionary and defensive characteristic of the Moroccan state confirms that civil society is a 
force that can shape, albeit sometimes accidentally, the structures of cooperation. 
As this paper has shown, the change in the domestic climate has been conducive to the 
protection of human rights but less so to the protection of the socio-economic rights of 
Moroccans. The creation of associations, particularly in the field of human rights and women’s 
rights, remains a middle-class phenomenon, whereas development associations have 
traditionally been based in the community. Elitism is another feature of civil society, whereby 
the main concerns of many influential organisations are broadly out of touch with those of the 
population as a whole. Put differently, social services respond to the vital needs of the majority 
of the population whereas civic and political rights do not yet correspond with the realities on 
the ground. 
The state tries to position itself as an interface and coordinator. Facing new challenges, the state 
is rebuilding its domination through civil society. The state’s strategy of co-option and division 
has resulted in rivalries, competition and splits among CSOs. Some CSOs assume correcting 
and controlling functions vis-à-vis the state, while others take on service provision and advisory 
roles. As such, Moroccan civil society is highly fragmented and is lacking the clear leadership 
structures that could provide CSOs working in different areas with a politically forceful critical 
mass. 
At the same time, civil society has been hijacked by the security and trade concerns of the EU 
and the makzen. One source of dissatisfaction is the perception that economic and security 
agendas are seen to focus primarily on a rather one-sided notion of free trade and on controlling 
illegal immigration, marginalising the very socio-political elements that EU discourse so 
vocally promotes (e.g. democratic progress, sustainable development and human rights).  
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